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Modern Values*
Content and Contributors 
JAN TULLBERG**
Moderne Werte – Inhalt und Beitragende 
There are interdependences between the market economy and more general values in modern European 
societies. In this article, I will discuss the contribution of both theory and more practical morals of the 
market. Another source of influence on values is the unselfishness demanded by religion and honored 
by most philosophers. I will discuss whether this demand is positive. There is a danger of trivialization 
of ethics into a public-relations discourse, which reduces its function as an aid in dilemmas and as a 
serious constraint on behavior. An agent-neutral universalism is often suggested, but for companies 
with ambitions of setting norms, a more particularistic ethics is of interest. An appropriate theory to 
this is largely missing and many important issues are treated as juridical rather than ethical matters. 
There are reasons for business and economic ethics to reconsider the usefulness of conventional ethics, as 
it might be less a part of the solution than a part of value problems of modern societies. 
Keywords: New Conformism, Instrumentalism, Media-driven, Idealism, Hypocrisy 
1. Introduction 
There is widespread criticism of capitalism and modern society by conservatives, 
socialists and postmodernists. The intensity of the critique varies, but there is a com-
mon opinion that the market economy has negative effects on morality and value 
formation: materialism among consumers, alienation among employees, and greed 
among shareholders. But do we really face a value problem in modern Europe? If so, 
what is the cause, and what would be the remedy?
This article discusses present European values on two levels. The following section 
examines values from the standpoint of moral influence exerted by three major 
spheres of society. What is brought across to the modern European individual from 
the market, civil society, and the state, respectively? 
The third section focuses on the ethics behind the morals of the three spheres. The 
distinction applied here, is that morals are seen as prescriptive ethics, while the term 
ethics is used for the theoretical framework and the justification for advocating special 
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moral theses. Of special interest is the influence of the academic field of business and 
economic ethics. Can ethical theories be helpful in improving the practical morals in a 
society? Section four penetrates the environment for moral discourse and its effect on 
ethical messages. The article concludes with a diagnosis of moral health and a judg-
ment of the contributions of business ethics.  
2. Three spheres of society influencing the individual 
The content in this section can be illustrated by a diagram. 
Figure 1: Spheres and their influences on values 
Already Aristotle argued for the interconnection between behavior and virtue. We 
manifest our moral beliefs in behavior and there is also an influence in the opposite 
direction. Our behavior and its effects also influence our ideas about how things 
ought to be done. Normative ideas and empirical facts are not seen as independent, 
nor as fully integrated, but as interconnected. Often the importance of theory and 
values is overrated and the dependence on factual accuracy underrated. In his treatise 
on ideology Tingsten (1941) states that its main substance consists of judgments about 
the empirical world and that values form the minor part. Ideology often implies 
dogmatic ideas about how the world works, and its loss of attraction is often caused 
by an excessive discrepancy between reality and the “politically conscious” picture. 
Ideology and theory are empirically vulnerable in a longer perspective. But there is 
also an influence from ideas on reality, that is, human practice. This influence can be 
illustrated by the catastrophic effects totalitarian ideologies have on human behavior. 
Expecting that the morals of each sphere is primarily influenced by activities and 
changes from within, we will now look separately into each of them. The society in 
focus is the modern European welfare state and the major changes that exert an 
influence on normative beliefs. I do not make the assumption that the economy is the 
paramount driving force of change. There are also possibilities of endogenous changes 
values of
individuals in
the society
market
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society
politics
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in the other two spheres. Therefore it is not sufficient to just look into the economy, 
when a wider view is necessary. The focus on modern society does not exclude con-
tributions from old sources making reflections and observations of prevailing rele-
vance. Aristotle and Adam Smith have something worth considering also in our time.  
2.1 Market and morality 
Economic activity has always been a most important part in human social life, and has 
brought about profound changes when society developed from a feudal to an indus-
trial society. Commercial exchange grew in importance and emphasized aspects of 
reciprocity and material progress. 
For Adam Smith the economic system fostered the cultivation of virtues: 
“In the middling and inferior stations of life the road to virtue and that to for-
tune (…) are happily in most cases very nearly the same (…) real and solid pro-
fessional abilities joined to prudent, just, firm, and temperate conduct, can very 
seldom fail of success.” (Smith 1759, part 1, sector 3, chapter 3) 
People could occasionally be tempted to choose short-term goals, but generally they 
would act in the long term for the good of themselves and indirectly also for that of 
society. 
Peter Drucker (1946) argued that it is rather the company than the church which 
provides the mode of organization in society. Experience from employment is a 
strong factor when individuals are determining which virtues are respected and hon-
ored and which ones are mainly rhetorical.  
When organizations become flatter and larger, employees are increasingly in need of 
social skills in order to interact within a social order which is not clearly determined by 
superiority or subordination. Reciprocity is what is demanded by others and also by 
the employer. “What is in this for me?” becomes a legitimate question. To establish 
cooperation there is also need for the question “How can I contribute?” 
There is no small amount of literature on how people can be corrupted into begging, 
stealing and borrowing. Hirsch (1976) describes the futility of the consumer rat race, 
and Jackall (1988) the cynicism in the managerial rat race. Intellectuals often ridicule 
the middle class and its values, but it has nevertheless a strong appeal for most people. 
Ambitions towards higher material standards and good education for one’s children 
are common goals, and they are important prerequisites for the formation of democ-
ratic values (Moore 1969). If the market economy is as demoralizing and as burdened 
with unethical incentives as critics claim, one must wonder how to explain why its 
employees and consumers are behaving so well. 
During the Enlightenment a dominant idea was that virtues of commerce even influ-
enced people with political power. Adam Smith, Montesquieu and many others pro-
posed the so-called Doux-commerce thesis (Hirschman 1997). One way to express this 
idea is by depicting zero-sum games. When turning away from faith, tradition, princi-
ples and pride to simple self-interest, the focus shifts to finding positive-sum games. It 
was easier to advance one’s interests by obtaining win-win solutions with others than 
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by trying to prevail as the only winner. War and conflicts generally result in negative-
sum games and often even in lose-lose outcomes. 
This theory of positive influence by commerce is clearly supported by reality. Market 
societies have been strongly inclined to avoid war, especially against each other. How-
ever, several political ideologies have not observed this development. The Marxist 
conviction that the economy is a zero-sum game is popular and, according to its 
assumption, the mere fact that some people get richer implies that others become 
worse off. The decolonization of the world has not impressed those who are still 
convinced that “monopoly capitalism” demands imperialism by the rich country 
governments.
2.2 Civil societies and morality 
There are some controversies in several countries about the provision of education 
and health care by private instead of public organizations. This follows an earlier and 
more fundamental change, the shift from welfare based on a kinship society to welfare 
provided by the state. In addition to the discussion about commercialization, there is 
the more crucial one about professionalization. The major step taken has been from 
Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft (Tönnies 1887). There has been a transfer in the care for the 
old, young and sick from the family to the state.  
The expansion of the public sector often started by providing basic school education 
and continued with money transfers to an increasing number of groups and purposes. 
Dependence on other family members never came without strings attached, as the 
family was a web of rights and of obligations. Therefore, formal and impersonal 
relations with social authorities were generally preferred by the voters, who supported 
this shift of responsibility from civil society to the state. Every change entails some 
disadvantages and many social phenomena like “atomism” and loneliness concern this 
depersonalizing shift in the modern welfare state. 
There are other changes in civil society that are relevant for value formation. Seculari-
zation fostered a shift toward influence for the market. But this is more of a retreat of 
religion than an intrusion by the market. There are reasons to observe that there are 
other changes in society than those driven by the market. The main reason for de-
creased church attendance is hardly to be found in shops open on Sundays, but in the 
problem for faith to compete with the scientific world view. 
Robert Putnam (1993) has been influential with research indicating an active civil 
society during the renaissance as an important condition for the take-off of capitalism. 
Today these forms of social interaction seem to be fading away (Putnam 2000). Mod-
ern man is an individualist, but there are strains of isolationism in this individualism. 
Sociologists see a trend towards a change from roles to identities (Udehn 1996). But 
whereas different roles often complement one another, identities are basically separat-
ing one group from another. Furthermore, migration and new subcultures contribute 
to a fragmentation of society and to lower levels of trust (Putnam 2007). 
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2.3 Politics and morality  
The building of a welfare state has not been a reform with a deficit in public support, 
but the development of moral responsibility may be questioned. There has been a 
shift away from an old-time belief that income and cost should be equal. Even the 
First International prescribed a balance with the following proverb: “Do your duties, 
claim your rights”. Instead, the political left promotes that the rich should pay, while 
the right promotes payments by dynamic effects and less bureaucracy. Politicians have 
no little part in creating the impression that somebody else is paying for the voter’s 
benefits. 
The voters’ pressure has intensified. Already 50 years ago, politicians like the Swedish 
social-democratic Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, lamented “the discontent of rising 
expectations”. A later center-right Prime Minister, Ola Ullsten, termed the voter 
attitude as “the Claim Machine”. Presently, there are problems with pension reforms 
in many states of Europe. Demographic change implies higher contributions to pen-
sion funds, or lower pensions per person and month, or a higher pension entry age. 
The voters are in deep denial of the necessity of such a hard choice. 
It would be a major omission to not comment on the effect of the EU super-state. It 
seems that the ongoing harmonization process will have a negative effect on real as 
well as on perceived democracy. National elections with a turn to the left or the right 
will have little impact on Brussels. There, the power is solidly acquired by center-left 
politicians with good connections to the center-right, and politicians of the center-
right who can do business with the center-left. Hence, a Brussels consensus can 
achieve a solid support even if the voters would disagree with the decision (Siedentop 
2000). This centralization implies another step away from the republican citizen at the 
town square exercising both a privilege and a duty. Political virtues, like other virtues, 
demands a praxis and if the voters see little result of weather they engage or not, they 
are likely to disengage. 
Another problem with the European harmonization is that it causes the disappearance 
of institutional competition within the EU since the most important laws and frame-
works are enacted on the European level. This diminishes the possibility of radical 
inventions on the national level. Instead there is a political tendency towards the mean 
or a Grand Compromise. It appears as if the left’s ideas of social harmonization and 
the right’s of competitive harmonization are both being realized.  
Across countries, membership in political parties has dwindled. The parties as organi-
zations of socialization have decreased in importance (Isaksson 2006). In several ways 
the ideological content has also diminished, as there may be a small step from being 
pragmatic to being free from principles. In many countries the frequency of triangu-
larization (the tactics of politicians to “steal” values previously associated with the rival 
party) has blurred the position previously advocated. Even if the political differences 
between the major political parties have become smaller, the political debate remains 
too antagonistic to convey an impression of open-minded efforts in order to cooper-
ate between competing parties. Public polls indicate a low regard for politicians.  
A common opinion is that there has been a power shift from politicians to the media. 
Research on the public perception in Sweden on the influence of seven groups in 
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society (business being one of them) on the political agenda shows a continuous shift 
between the years 1989 and 2005. In the first survey, journalists came third after the 
government and the political parties. In 2005 journalists were considered the most 
influential group regarding the political agenda (Asp 2007). This power is manifested 
in a personalization of politics and an increased importance attributed to the commu-
nicative ability of politicians. It seems likely that politicians rather direct their attention 
to the median journalist than to the median voter. The medium becomes a larger part 
of the message. Such a shift is accentuated if also voters become more concerned 
about the media performance of politicians rather than making more complicated 
judgments about the effects of different solutions to political problems. 
2.4 Modern morality 
The present analysis agrees with many others in that the market has acquired greater 
influence compared to other spheres of society. However, this is not a negative devel-
opment since there are mostly positive effects. Furthermore, it is not the case that the 
market has crowded out good virtues from other spheres. Instead, they themselves 
have backed away from prior positions.  
Ronald Inglehart has been in charge of a major research project entitled “World 
Values Survey” and found some interesting societal patterns. In this study values are 
measured in two dimensions on a diagram: “Traditional values – Secular values” and 
“Survival values – Self-expression values”. European countries tend towards the 
upper right hand side, indicating high numbers of secular and self-expression values 
(Pettersson 2006). 
What is the importance of these values? Inglehart’s data indicate causality from eco-
nomic affluence generated by the market economy to a change toward more self-
expressive values, and furthermore causality from this value change to democracy 
(Inglehart 2003). The self-expressive values are not ascetic, but they indicate a distanc-
ing from materialism, and are termed “post-materialism”. Compared to a starving 
person who is desperate to get a bag of rice the interest in a Gucci bag is more relaxed 
– even if both the ad agencies and their critics claim that the luxury consumption 
mood is obsessive. Decreasing marginal utility does not imply that we will turn anti-
materialistic, but that other desires move up to the top of the mind. Post-materialism 
is not the same as idealism, but takes for granted a high material standard and moves 
the attention to new issues without losing sense for material self-interest. This may be 
illustrated by the saying “No food, one problem – lots of food, many problems”. In 
contrast, seeing ourselves as slaves of created desires is commonly considered a more 
sophisticated opinion of the modern self. 
Robert Wuthnow (1994) penetrated empirical values in a book entitled God and Mam-
mon in America. Here the attitudes toward Christian asceticism and consumerism are 
explored. Wuthnow finds both a strong support for Christian values with a radical 
anti-materialistic stance such as “Money is the root of all evil” as well as a strong 
support for materialism when the wording is used without a religious connotation. 
Wuthnow explains this finding with the notion “compartmentalization”. It implies 
that individuals simultaneously support two value sets. The respondents confirm this 
split since 68 percent of the respondents agree with the statement: “Money is one 
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thing, morality and values are completely different”. These two studies indicate a 
strong influence on modern citizen by market economy. However, this does not imply 
a transition from virtue to vice, but in important respects a change in reverse direc-
tion. Tolerance is an important virtue in a liberal society and is often hailed as the 
result of enlightened reflection. But it should be accepted that the less praised phe-
nomena of indifference pulls in the same direction, as noted by John Stuart Mill 
(1859). When people become less religious, they also become less interested in the 
religious beliefs of others. Egocentrism shown in self-expressive values and affluence 
in a welfare society foster indifference toward others, and to some degree soften the 
demand on others for conformity. A social animal has an awareness of demands for 
conformity; the level of tolerance is only partly a matter of individual choice, as it is 
also linked to the society’s mentality.  
3. Business ethics and two theoretical positions 
As mentioned in the introduction, the purpose of this article is to look into the influ-
ence of ethics, not just morals. On this theoretical level the discourse of a minor 
group, academics in business and economic ethics, will now be given some extra 
attention. Their positions on some theoretical issues such as universalism, instrumen-
talism and Darwinism are most important for the development of sound practical 
recommendations for business morals.  
3.1 Universalism 
The notion of universalism is divided into two main types. One type is called “idealis-
tic universalism” and based on the assumption of agent-neutrality. The second type of 
universalism is “empirical universalism”. It operates with subgroup patterns with 
different sets of right and duties where important subgroups are families, extended 
families, tribes, churches, nations and also companies and professions. 
Idealistic universalism is often assumed to prevail, so that all violations are seen as 
discrimination. However, there are reasons to consider the power of differentiation in 
our moral intuitions. Already David Hume suggests a sociobiological order of prefer-
ences. 
“A man naturally loves his children better than his nephews, his nephews better 
than his cousins, his cousins better than strangers.” (Hume 1740: 483-484) 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon noted that love is diluted if spread to everybody: 
“If all the world is my brother, then I have no brother.” (Hardin 1993: 235) 
There is by necessity a dilution of energy and emotions when divided between a larger 
number of receivers. A person may have a circle of 20 close friends, but many of the 
relationships one has out of a circle of 200 persons would more appropriately be 
described as acquaintances.  
Adam Smith (1776) expressed the differences in emotional commitment by comparing 
“self-love” with “fellow-feeling”. He argues that, because of this difference in motiva-
tion, we are much more likely to achieve interaction with others if we refer to their 
self-love rather than by appealing to their fellow-feeling for us. 
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Figure 2: Idealistic universalism versus empirical universalism 
How do these general reflections relate to business ethics? I think a major problem is 
that the company is missing in the picture of idealistic universalism, which does not 
differentiate between subcultures, and hence does not account for the company as a 
partly independent moral community. Approaches such as the “stakeholder theory” 
which receives wide popularity within the academic discourse, suggests long lists of 
multiple purposes and principals. But responsibility for everything and everybody in 
the sense of idealistic universalism implies an open mandate for the company leader-
ship (Heath/Norman 2004). If the stakeholder approach is to have any coherence, 
priority must be given to employees, customers, suppliers and those communities with 
which the company actually has relationships. But making such priorities is according 
to universal idealism discriminatory against those who do not have this connection.  
The meso-level issues, the rules and the relations of a specific company, are not ac-
counted for in idealistic universalism. Interests and responsibilities have to be concen-
trated and some relations must be given more priority than others. This circumstance 
is not acknowledged and the conflict with the philosophical assumptions has not been 
thoroughly reflected. The dilemma should be solved by a differentiation of the com-
pany’s responsibilities and abandoning idealistic universalism as philosophical frame-
work.
3.2 The virtues of instrumentalism 
A second theoretical issue is the view of intrinsic and instrumental values. One view 
dominates in philosophy and another is proposed by economics and evolutionary 
theory.
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can be universalized
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Philosophers state moral goals as second-order preferences, first principles and intrin-
sic values. Kant’s idea of “the kingdom of ends” can be used as an illustration. In-
strumental values are subordinated as means to accomplish the higher goals. In the 
other perspective, roles and causality are different as illustrated in the following figure. 
Figure 3: Intrinsic and instrumental values 
In conventional philosophy, values to be endorsed are often called intrinsic as a 
substitute for their ultimate justification. Correspondingly, economic goals and the 
market economy as such are devaluated by the term “instrumental”. In the evolution-
ary view, democracy is also for good reason classified as instrumental, but that does 
not imply a downgrading.  
The serious societal problems to which we should pay attention should be based on 
the concept of instrumentality. There is seldom any possibility to find perfect rules, 
only expect such that function rather well. Bounded rationality (Simon 1947) is not 
just a matter of more prosaic choices, but also of ethical ones. Societal rules are not 
for computers or for saints, but for Homo sapiens. That a rule is not divine, deductive 
or strongly supported by our intuitions is not a fatal characteristic eliminating the 
rationale for following the rule. The best intellectual argument for a rule is not a 
sacred character, but the shortcomings of other rules, including pragmatic ad hoc 
policies. 
Regarding intrinsic values, my understanding is that the field of business ethics is 
strongly influenced by the philosophical tradition. There is good reason to be skeptical 
about declarations of rights, first principles, and moral intuitions that are built mainly 
on concepts of faith. Such ideas generally appear weaker if elaborated in a reflective 
way, so authority provides the best support. However, secular idealistic philosophers 
are being abandoned by belief in the strongest authority of first principles – the divine 
authority. Business ethicists should dare to be more heretical. 
3.3 Economics and Darwinism 
There are other sources which could be of interest for ethical theorists. Game theory 
is a dynamic field of stringent reasoning with implications for value formation (Bin-
more 1994, 1998). Experimental economics (Smith 1991) are an appropriate way to 
test the crucial link from theory to practice. Axelrod (1984) provides a classic experi-
ment about different strategies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and proves that the strate-
Philosophical view
Evolutionary view
intrinsic values
as goals
instrumental values
as means
ultimate instrumental
rationality
adaptive intrinsic
values
Cognitive and social revisions when
values perceived maladaptive
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gies an individual chooses are central for the overall outcome. From the economics 
point of view a sustainable moral is one that gives the participants rational reason to 
engage in cooperative behavior. Although behavioral economics, (starting with pros-
pect theory by Kahneman/Tversky 1979), is rather a descriptive approach, it serves to 
identify motivations and behavioral patterns and thus is an important contribution to 
finding appropriate normative rules. I suggest to let the feasible restrict the desirable. 
If human beings in reality prove not to be as rational or not as good-hearted as as-
sumed in some theories, this motivates revisions. 
Some people attribute altruism and a religious purpose as necessary requirements for 
ethics. I will not elaborate at length about an alternative, but mention two central ideas 
of secular ethical theory. Respected thinkers, like Cicero, Confucius, Hume, and 
others consider reciprocity, not altruism, central for morality. Neo-Darwinism has 
explored the function of kin-selection – the genetic disposition to make sacrifices for 
relatives (Hamilton 1964). These theories do not support agent-neutrality, but implies 
very strong obligations towards specific persons and weaker towards others. With 
these fundamental preferences we may be able work out rules that are instrumental for 
cooperation and serve to regulate conflicts of interest. Realism, not optimism, might 
be the prime virtue. 
4. The environment of business ethics messages 
One instrumental aspect of rules is the effect of their aggregated number. A new rule 
is not only an addition, but also a subtraction from the observance of the other rules. 
The Ten Commandments were limited in number and nine of the ten were negative: 
“thou shalt not”. Modern moral philosophy uses a softer “you ought to”. Still, lists of 
obligatory and supererogatory duties can be all too long. This also applies to business 
ethics, as illustrated by the development of codes in Britain. The Cadbury Code of 
Best Practice started up in 1992 with 19 recommendations. The revision in 1998 
increased the number to 45. This has been followed by another revision in 2003 
making 83 recommendations. 
These rules have the liberal clause of “comply or explain”, but if the list becomes very 
long explaining becomes a harder task. A larger number of rules increases the ten-
dency to conformism. The experience from a Swedish code is that one third of the 
companies complied to a 100 percent, one third excluded a single clause, and one 
third excluded 2-4 clauses, but none excluded more than four (Dalborg 2007). Many 
supererogatory duties have a tendency to become obligatory. Not least, there is a 
pattern in EU policy starting with soft law, by introducing a standard, and then step by 
step to develop the reference point into a sanctioned demand (Torbiörn 2003). 
If conformism is strong and demands are comprehensive, possible reactions are 
passive or active hypocrisy. By passive hypocrisy I mean the policy of not arguing 
against a rule, but making the general claim of being a law-abiding agent. There is no 
bragging about conforming to the rule, but a policy to avoid “explaining” a divergent 
position. When caught deviating, this type of agent does not argue for the deviation, 
but rather acts as a repentant sinner. 
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The active hypocrisy policy is to not prompt suspicion and to induce some goodwill 
by verbally supporting virtuous positions. Bernard Shaw made the ironic comment 
“The higher the moral standing a person has reached, the greater the number of 
things that make her feel ashamed”. Several company scandals like Enron illustrate 
efforts to cover up negligence of central moral principles with enthusiasm for supere-
rogatory morals (Rampersad 2003). The rationale for such behavior is the hope that, 
with high goals, some shortcomings of the company are accepted as unavoidable and 
therefore less reprehensible. 
Active hypocrisy is addressed in many other terms, such as “green wash” (environ-
mental window-dressing) or “blue wash” (exploiting the goodwill of the United 
Nations). One problem with hypocrisy is to not living up to the respected values. 
Another problem is the support to values that in reality are not worthy of being 
admired. If goals and rules are distant visions selected for their rhetorical qualities, it 
should not be surprising that some of them are not suitable for actual use. The selec-
tion of rules for economic life is a difficult and complicated matter, and there is a need 
to separate the choice of adequate rules from pure marketing considerations. By this I 
refer to NGOs as well as to companies. 
Lord Keynes made a relevant comment on conformism: 
“Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally 
than to succeed unconventionally.” (Keynes 1936: 158) 
A paradox in the modern world is that, despite the development towards more indi-
vidual freedom and product differentiation of companies, there are strong forces in 
favor of conformism. To understand this new conformism the term “media-driven” is 
central. It refers to the media as a central societal force with many consequences both 
for politics and business. Different opinions converge into a rhetoric of “doing good”, 
and all vested interests are reformulated to new euphemistic labels. A public-relations 
perspective emphasizes “getting through the television screen” as sympathetic; the 
content of the message becomes less important than the question whether it commu-
nicates well. Responsiveness and political correctness become important, which results 
in the avoidance of controversial priorities and issues. This is the environment in 
which business ethics is situated.  
5. Conclusion
By historic standards Europeans now live in societies with a functioning moral and a 
decent level of societal harmony and individual responsibility. The weaknesses in 
ethical behavior observed are to a high degree caused by the political and civil spheres. 
Here the sense of responsibility becomes weaker and the relevance and justification of 
different duties are questioned. Rather than criticizing the market for undermining 
morals, it seems to me that the market has become more important for sustaining pro-
social behavior. A classical criticism has been the one of economic incentives crowd-
ing out other more noble motives (Titmuss 1971). To me it looks as if these noble 
motives are crowding out each other and are not suitable for providing support to a 
serious priority. 
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A common judgment is that the market has a strong influence on individual values 
and behavior. This article also claims that this morality maintains a high standard. The 
fellow employee is a person who generally behaves decently. Companies can also be 
expected to behave decently in order to meet reasonable consumer expectations. Can 
the morality be further improved? The answer is certainly yes, with the reservation 
that it can also be impaired if revisions are inappropriate – and this regardless of the 
best of intentions. 
Concerning the level of ethics – in contrast to the less theoretical and more prescrip-
tive, morals – religious ideas and secular idealistic ideas of civil society are predomi-
nant. The ethical point of view tends to be that of God, or what Henry Sidgwick 
(1874) called “the point of view of the universe”. Ethics is much less influenced by 
economics and rules compatible with market economy. For many persons engaged in 
business ethics, the mission is to transfer the ethics of civil society to the morality of 
the market. This mission is sometimes described as “integrative business ethics” 
(Ulrich 2002) and “embedding” the economy in society (DeGeorge 1999). Conven-
tional ethics is considered appropriate and only requires its implementation.  
Figure 4: Major influence of ethics and morals on values 
The figure highlights the two most important factors influencing the modern individ-
ual: the moral of the market and the ethics of civil society. According to the analysis 
conventional ethics has not contributed positively to the morals of the political and 
civil spheres and its possibility to improve economic morality should therefore also be 
questioned. Rather, some constructive “market ethics” would be useful. 
Already the Sophists in Plato’s Republic brought up the possibility that ethics dealt with 
the appearance of having virtue, not with really having virtue. This evident danger of 
ethics being a public-relations activity has made little impression on ethics, but mostly 
elicited complaints about implementation; the spirit is praised as willing, but the flesh 
is characterized as weak (Matthew 26:41). It is often appealing to combine idealistic 
values of
individuals in
the society
market
morality
civil society
ethics
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principles with pragmatism. It appears to be both kind and flexible, but generally does 
more to obscure problems than to solve them. 
This article wants to raise concerns about the quality of conventional ethics. Those 
concerns are reflected in Richard Posner critical judgment: 
“Moral theory is like a system of mathematics that has never gotten beyond ad-
dition.” (Posner 1999: 50) 
At present, the possibility that ethics, not morals, is the weaker part is not sufficiently 
considered. There are plenty of proposals for values, models and policies to import 
from moral philosophy – but the justification is mostly a mere appeal to ambition. To 
be improved, morals probably need better ethical theories than those presently domi-
nating. 
The main threat to morality is the risk of essential morals drowning in declarations of 
good intention. There is a public relation driven trend of one-upmanship and a con-
venient personal and corporate policy is to never challenge any proclaimed duty to do 
something altruistic. Hypocrisy becomes the common solution. In a dynamic world, 
traditional bonds of loyalty become less relevant and morality destabilizes. Therefore, 
it is even more important that there is an ethics that can contribute to maintaining a 
moral order that is constructive and realistic. Ethics is supposed to be of help in 
sustaining morals by providing good arguments and by helping to set priorities. This 
article claims that ethics presently is not capable of these tasks. Business ethicists 
therefore need to consider more inputs from theories of the sciences and be more 
critical towards conventional ethics. 
It is puzzling that there is much more interest in applying ethics to economics than in 
developing ethics with insights from the social sciences, in particular from economics. 
The practices of business are scrutinized, but strange assumptions in conventional 
ethics – such as idealistic universalism, espoused intrinsic values, and desirability lists 
without assigned priority – are accepted in an extremely benevolent manner. The 
intellectual way to improve morality is reflection, and there seem to be grounds for 
doubt about the benefits of respected ethical propositions. I hope that the foregoing 
discussion will encourage the development of a broad and constructive approach to 
these matters. Presently, ethics often undermines morals by suggesting supererogatory 
duties to become obligatory. Hopefully ethics will develop towards a more construc-
tive approach and become a remedy, not a threat, to essential morals. 
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